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JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
DECREES UNDER THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Article IV, section one of the U. S. Constitution requires each state
to give full faith and credit to the "public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State." In the area of extraterritorial recog-
nition of foreign divorce decrees, however, courts may consider con-
flicting states' interests in the marital status, the welfare of a child, the
property rights of the spouses, reciprocity between states, and the need
for putting an end to litigation in addition to the full faith and credit
requirement. These considerations have raised numerous jurisdictional
issues, some of which will be examined more specifically in this article.'
I. MARITAL STATUS
A. Divorce obtained ex parte
Before 1942 a state was not required to recognize a divorce obtained
in another state. In Haddock v. Haddock,2 the U. S. Supreme Court ruled
that even though one spouse might leave the state where the matrimonial
domicile3 was established, set up domicile in another state, and obtain
a divorce in an ex parte proceeding, the foreign decree need not be recog-
nized in the state of matrimonial domicile.
In the first Williams case (1942) ,4 however, the Supreme Court over-
ruled Haddock5 and declared that a foreign decree rendered in an ex parte
proceeding was entitled to extra-territorial recognition under the full
faith and credit clause. Here two citizens of North Carolina had estab-
lished residence in Nevada and obtained divorces from their respective
spouses in order to marry each other. Jurisdiction of the Nevada court
over the absent spouses had been obtained by constructive service. After
their marriage the couple returned to North Carolina where they were
later prosecuted for bigamy. In reversing the convictions and establish-
ing interstate recognition of the ex parte decrees, the Supreme Court
recognized that constructive service must satisfy due process require-
ments." However, the Court did not determine whether such a decree
'For a general discussion of interstate recognition of foreign divorce decrees, see Sum-
ner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees- Present Doctrine and Possible
Changes, 9 VAND. L. Rzv. 1 (1955); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127-139 (4th
ed. 1964); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71-92 (1962).
2201 U.S. 562 (1905).
'The state of matrimonial domicile is the state in which the couple last resided as man
and wife.
'Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'Supra note 2; Lorenzen, Harrock v. Haddock Overruled, 52 YALE L. J. 341 (1943).
'Supra note 4, at 299.
1
Muckelston: Jurisdictional Problems of Foreign Divorce Decrees
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1969
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
must be recognized if the plaintiff's domicile was not bona fide. This
opportunity presented itself three years later. The Williams case had
returned to the North Carolina court which examined the validity of
the couple's domiciles while in Nevada. Upon evidence that they had
set up temporary lodgings and then promptly returned to North Caro-
lina after gaining their divorces, it was held that no bona fide domicile
had been established.' The Nevada court, therefore, had no jurisdiction
to render a binding divorce decree under the full faith and credit
clause. Upon a second appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tions. It stated that in order for a foreign decree based on constructive
service against a non-resident to be entitled to full faith and credit in
a sister state, the divorce forum must be the bona fide domicile of the
plaintiff.8 The judgment of one state is conclusive on the merits in an-
other only if the first state had jurisdiction to pass on the merits, and
the basis of divorce jurisdiction is domicile.9 Consequently the foreign
decree is conclusive of everything except jurisdictional facts. Since
domicile is a jurisdictional fact, the issue of domicile is open to col-
lateral impeachment in the courts of a sister state. 10
B. Divorce where both spouses participate
WVhen the defendant participates in the divorce proceedings, either
by counsel11 or by personal appearance in court,'1 2 the foreign decree
based on a finding of bona fide domicile must be given recognition and
Pffect in annther state under the full faith and credit clause. 13 Since
both parties have participated in the proceeding, the opportunity was
available to contest jurisdiction, and the participants are thereafter
barred from collateral attack on the decree on jurisdictional grounds. 14
The sister-state court is precluded from relitigating the issues by the
doctrine of res judicata.15 This rule has been extended to apply where
one party merely files a waiver of service and entry of appearance; the
filing forecloses the jurisdictional question as res judicata and bars later
'Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
sid.
'Id. at 229.
eIRice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); -Crouch v. Crouch, 28 Cal.2d 243, 169 P.2d 897
(1946); Mott v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 407 F.2d 59 (CANJ,
1969).
"Knox v. Knox, 88 C.A.2d 666, 199 P.2d 766 (1948); Alderson v. Alderson, 454 P.2d
122 (Hawaii, 1969).
12Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1947) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Harley v.
Superior Court, 226 Cal.App.2d 432, 38 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1964).
"~Id.
"Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 251.
TSupra note 12.
[Vol. 31
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
NOTES
collateral attack.16 Collateral attack is allowed, however, if the party
attacking would be permitted such an attack in the courts of the render-
ing state.'7
Still to be determined was whether strangers, not parties to the
original foreign decree, were barred from collateral attack on the juris-
diction of the court rendering the divorce decree. In Johnson v. Muel-
berger,i s the husband had married three times. The wife of the second
marriage obtained a Florida divorce in which her husband appeared
and contested on the merits, but failed to contest jurisdiction. This wife
had not completed the ninety-day residence requirement. The husband
married again, and after his death, a child from his first marriage con-
tested the right of wife #3 to qualify for the widow's share. The child
attacked the Florida decree obtained by wife #2 as invalid since no
jurisdiction could be taken due to faulty residence. The Supreme
Court ruled that under full faith and credit, foreign decrees are binding
on third parties where both spouses appeared in the original proceed-
ing unless the rendering state would allow such attack by third parties.
Since the child could not challenge the decree under Florida law, she
could not do so in another state.19
In 1948 the Montana Supreme Court held that the doctrine of comity
prevented collateral attack by heirs to an estate on a divorce decree
obtained by the widow before marrying the decedent, even though the
full faith and credit clause would allow the attack.20 The widow had
obtained the divorce in an ex parte proceeding in Nevada, immediately
returned to Montana, and married the decedent. Under the rule in the
second Williams case2' the heirs could attack the validity of her domicile
in Nevada. The Court did not allow the attack. Under the principles
of comity, recognition of the Nevada decree would or be contrary to public
policy in Montana. 22
'"Reeves v. Reeves, La. 209 So.2d 554 (1968).
"Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal.App.2d 1, 38
Cal.Rptr. 357 (1964); Mumma v. Mumma, 86 Cal.App.2d 133, 194 P.2d 24 (1949)
(collateral attack allowed because prior rights would be prejudiced).
'Johnson, supra note 17.
"See Comment, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 376 (1957).
'In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515, 194 P.2d 621 (1948).
"Supra note 7.
'Another overriding factor in barring the attack was "enforcing the sanctity of a
marriage entered into in Montana." Supra note 20, at 525. In 1963 Montana enacted
the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, R.C.M.1947, § 21-150; however, there is no
evidence that the statute has been construed by the Montana Supreme Court. Oali-
fornia (Cal.Civ.Code § 150-150.4) and Washington (RCWA § 26.08.200-26.08.210)
adopted the Act in 1949. For these states' constructions, see In re Englund's Estate,
45 Wash.2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954) (stranger estopped from collaterally attacking
foreign divorce decree) ; Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953)
(party relying on foreign decree estopped from collateral attack); Marsh, The Uni-
form Divorce Recognition Act Sections 20 and 21 of the Divorce Act of 1949, 24
WASH. L. REv. 259 (1949); Note, Foreign Divorce Recognition in California, 16
HAST. L.J. 121 (1964).
1969]
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II. SUPPORT RIGHTS
A. Divisible Divorce
The Estin case, 23 involving an ex parte divorce, revived the divisible
res theory of Haddock.24 That is, jurisdiction over the marital status by a
bona fide domicile of one spouse does not preclude the state of matrimonial
domicile from retaining jurisdiction over the personal rights of the other
spouse. The Estin court held that a divorce decree obtained in a state
where the husband had acquired domicile is entitled to full faith and
credit only to the extent that the decree terminates the marital status.25
Recognition need not be extended to the point where the wife's rights
to separate maintenance under a previous decree rendered in the state
of matrimonial domicile would also be terminated. 26 Support obligations
arising from the marriage, therefore, are continuing unless the foreign
court acquires personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 27
In Estin the Supreme Court applied New York law which allowed
the support order to survive an out-of-state divorce decree. 28 However,
the laws of some states provide that the local support order will term-
inate when there is evidence of a divorce, foreign or domestic. 29
B. Enforcement of support rights
Suppose the divorce decree entitles the wife to monthly alimony,
but she subsequently moves to another state. Thereafter the husband
fails to make payments. The wife then attempts to recover the payments
'Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
2
'Supra note 2.
mSupra note 23.
2See Krieger v. Krieger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
'Supra note 23, at 214; Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959); Clyne
v. Clyne, 228 Cal.App.2d 597, 39 Cal.Rptr. 677 (1964); Bryan v. Bryan, 255 Cal.App.
2d 833, 63 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1967). In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957),
the Estin rule was held applicable to instances where the wife files for support after
the foreign decree has been rendered. For an excellent discussion of the Estin rule
and its general applicability in the U.S., see Rymanowski v. 4ymanowski, 249 A.2d
407 (R.I. 1969) and cases cited therein at 412; Spadea v. Spadea, 225 Ga. 80, 165
S.E.2d 836 (1969). Also see Ritz, Migratory Alimonys; A Constitutional Dilemma in
the Exercise of In Personam Jurisdiction, 29 FoRD L. REV. 83 (1960-61); Note,
Divorce with Full Faith and Credit, I5 VAND. L. REV. 1185, 1199-1200 (1965).
8Supra note 23; however, when the foreign court had personal jurisdiction over both
parties in the divorce proceeding, New York applies the support rule of the foreign
state which in Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748, 28 A.L.R.2d 1335, termi-
nated the New York support order. See also Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465,
283 P.2d 19 (1955) (applying N.J. law); Lednum v. Lednum, 85 Colo. 364, 276 P.2d
674 (1929) (support order survived because Montana decree not entitled to full faith
and credit).
'Jurczyk v. Jurczyk, 232 Cal.App.2d 270, 42 Cal;Rptr. 660 (1965); Jelly v. Jelly, 327
Mas. 706, 100 N.E.2d 681 (1951); -Commonwealth ex rel. McCormack v. McCormack,
164 Pa.Super. 553, 67 A.2d 603 (1949); Rodda v; Rodda, 185 Or. 140, 200 P.2d 616,
202 P.2d 638 (1948) cert den 337 U.S. 946 (1949).
[Vol. 31
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in a court of the state where she now resides. Is the court required under
the full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgment as to the accrued
alimony?
This question was answered by the Supreme Court in Sistare v.
Sistare.3 0 When these payments become due, a right to payment vests in
the wife and has such finality as to be entitled to full faith and credit
in a sister state. If, however, the accrued alimony is subject to modifi-
cation according to the state law of the rendering court or the provisions
of the decree, the decree is not entitled to full faith and credit. The state
court in Sistare was required to render judgment for the accrued alimony
even though the foreign decree could be modified prospectively as to
future installments.3 1
In Espeland v. Espeland32 a Washington alimony decree was held
enforceable by the Montana court, not under the full faith and credit
clause but under the principles of comity. The Court applied the Sistare
ruling33 which did not entitle the decree to full faith and credit because
the Washington court had reserved the right to modify the accrued
alimony.34 But in the Gibson case35 the Montana court refused to apply
the concept of comity386 or give full faith and credit to a New York ali-
mony decree. Since the accrued alimony could be modified under New
York law, the award did not come within the ambit of the full faith and
credit requirement as stated in Sistare.3 7
The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1968) 37a
will probably resolve the conflicting results of the Gibson and Espeland
cases. Upon registration of a foreign support order,38 it
... shall be treated in the same manner as a support order issued
by the court of this state. It has the same effect and is subject
to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening,
vacating, or staying as a support order of this state and may be
enforced and satisfied in like manner.' (emphasis added)
-218 U.S. 1 (1909).
"Id. For those jurisdictions upholding the Sistare rule, see Catlett v. Catlett, Okl. 412
P.2d 942 (1966); Bowling v. Bowling, 100 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio,.1951).
"
2Espeland v. Espeland, 111 Mont. 365, 109 P.2d 792 (1941).
'Supra note 30.
"The U.S. Supreme Court suggested in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946) that
alimony decrees subject to retroactive modifications by the rendering court could be
enforced in a sister state if the enforcing court had personal jurisdiction over both
spouses and the defendant could present those defenses to which he'd be entitled in
the rendering state.
'Gibson v. Gibson, 137 Mont. 528, 353 P.2d 344 (1960).
"Id. at 533.
'Supra note 30.
.aRepl. Vol. 7, R.O.M.1947, tit. 93, ch. 2601.
'Repl. Vol. 7, R.C.M.1947, § 93-2601-77.
'Repl. Vol. 7, R.C.M.1947, § 93-2601-80.
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Under California's interpretation of this Act, a court is required to
recognize and enforce foreign support decrees, whether subject to
retroactive or prospective modification or not.40
III. CHILD CUSTODY
The modifiable nature of foreign decrees granting child custody
has prohibited the strict application of the full faith and credit clause.4'
Other considerations, however, such as the best interests of the child,
the State as parens patriae, and changed circumstances have permitted
courts to bypass the full faith and credit requirement, ignore the foreign
decree as res judicata, and modify the decree on the basis of new facts. 42
Although child custody decrees rendered in an ex parte proceeding are
not entitled to full faith and credit in another state,43 the Halvey decision
established that a sister state could modify a custody decree in the same
manner as the rendering state without a violation to the full faith and
credit clause. 4 4 Changed circumstances is the basis of modification of a
foreign decree in many jurisdictions, including Montana. 45 New York
relies on its role as parens patriae to determine the welfare of a child
in its jurisdiction, regardless of its domicile or a foreign decree award-
ing custody.46
In determining the validity of a foreign decree in this state, the
Montana Supreme Court has considered three factors in examining child
custody jurisdiction: (1) in personam jurisdiction over the child's par-
ents, (2) the child's domicile, and (3) the physical presence of the child
within the rendering state.47 The cases concerning recognition of foreign
custody decrees in Montana fall within the following three categories.
'
0Worthley, supra note 28 and cases cited therein; Comment, Interstate Recognition of
Alimony Decrees, 41 CALiF. L. Rzv. 692 (1953); Leverett v. Superior Court, 222 Cal.
App.2d 126, 34 Cal.Rptr. 784 (1963) (once foreign decree established in California,
California court has continuing jurisdiction to modify decree).
"In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 412 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1966); Foster v. Foster, 9
Cal.2d 719, 68 P.2d 719 (1937).
"Infra notes 45, 46.
"May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952); Hazard, May v. Andersons; Preamble to
Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959).
"Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1946).
"Albright v. Albright, 45 N.M. 302, 115 P.2d 59 (1941); Slade v. Slade, 212 Ga. 758,
95 S.E.2d. 620 (1956); Cleeland v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958);
In re Wren, 48 Cal.2d 159, 308 P.2d 329 (1957); Bloom v. Wilde, 42 Ohio Ops. 404,
59 Ohio L.Abs. 20, 94 N.E.2d 656 (1950); Tolman v. Wassom, 16 Utah2d 258, 399
P.2d 147 (1965); infra note 53. One rationale given was that custody proceedings
under a divorce decree must be given full faith and credit in other states only as to
the right of the custody of the child at the time and under the circumstances when
the decree was originally rendered. Rodgers, supra note 41.
"Hahn v. Falce, 56 Misc.2d 427, 289 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1968) (citing New York cases as
well as other jurisdiction that apply this approach). Also see the Kansas rule of
'independent investigation", EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 290.
'
TApplication of Enke, 129 Mont. 353, 360, 287 P.2d 19 (1955).
[Vol. 31
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
NOTES
A. Child brought to Montana after foreign decree rendered
In Nipp v. Nipp,4s the father brought his son to Montana where they
established residence in violation of a Nebraska custody decree forbidding
each parent to interfere with the visitation rights of the other. The
mother persuaded the Nebraska court to modify the decree and grant
custody of the son to her. She sought return of the child through a writ
of habeas corpus. The father challenged the jurisdiction of the Nebraska
court to modify the custody award when the child was domiciled in
Montana. The Court held that the modification was binding in Montana
because the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court continued under its ori-
ginal decree in face of the father's violation. In recognizing the foreign
decree under full faith and credit, the Court insisted this was the only
proper procedure. Otherwise Montana would be sitting in review of
the Nebraska courts.49 The Court, however, expressly reserved the right
to determine the status of persons within its jurisdiction,5" but obviously
was not going to aid the abducting parent.51 Apparently the in personam
jurisdiction of the Nebraska court over the parents and the domicile
of the child in Nebraska when the decree was rendered was the basis
of recognizing the decree.
In 1955, the site of the child's domicile was controlling. In the
Enke case, 52 a California court issued an interlocutory decree granting the
mother custody of the children, as had been agreed to by both parents.
Between the time after this decree was rendered and before the final
decree was entered, she moved to Montana with the children. A few
years later the father won a modification of the decree in California,
gaining custody. The Montana court refused to recognize the California
modification under full faith and credit since the children were lawfully
domiciled in Montana at the time the modification was made, even
through the mother had been represented by counsel and resisted the
custody change.
The Court distinguished the Nipp and Enke decisions in Corkill v.
Cloninger,53 which involved a situation almost identical to that in Enke.
Nipp recognizes that a court of a sister state lawfully possessing
jurisdiction to modify such award retains continuing jurisdiction to
modify such award even though such child subsequently becomes
domiciled in another state. Enke denies jurisdiction to determine
"346 Mont. 425, 128 P. 590 (1912).
"Id. at 436.
boId.
mApparent application of the "clean hands" rule, coined by Ehrenzweig, where one
parent abducts the child, and takes it to another state disobeying the foreign deree
in hopes of getting the decree modified in another stat. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1
§ 88.
52Supra note 47.
526 St. Rep. 271 (Mont. 1969).
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custody to any court outside the state of the child's then existing
domicile. With this basic holding in Enke we cannot agree and
expressly overrule it."
The Court went on to hold that the California decree was entitled to
full faith and credit in Montana on the basis of the continuing juris-
diction theory stemming from Nipp.55 A change in the child's domicile,
however, could vest the state of domicile with concurrent jurisdiction to
modify the decree upon evidence of a change in circumstances. 6
B. Child brought to Montana before decree rendered
In cases where one parent tries to defeat jurisdiction in a foreign
court by bringing the children into Montana before the decree is ren-
dered, Montana has consistently held that the custody award of the other
state will be recognized under either the full faith and credit clause or
the principles of comity. 57
C. Child brought to Montana by agreement of the parents
Where the parent awarded custody by a foreign court voluntarily
relinquishes custody to the other parent, Montana views the relinquish-
ment as a waiver of the custodial parent's rights under the foreign
decree.58 If the children are domiciled in Montana, the courts here have
concurrent jurisdiction to modify the decree if there is evidence of
changed circumstances. 59 However, when there is insufficient evidence
that the custodial parent voluntarily gave the children to the other
parent, the Court has enforced the foreign court's decree, refusing to take
jurisdiction to determine if the custody award should be modified. 60
IV. CONCLUSION
It is evident that no hard and fast rule can be stated concerning the
enforcement of the foreign divorce decree under the full faith and
credit clause. The conflicting interests of two states seems to be waning
in favor of the assurance individuals need that their marital status won't
change by crossing state lines. Unless the foreign decree is recognized
and enforced, the challenging party is forced to return to the courts of
the rendering state which proves costly and increases litigation.
5Id. at 276.
Supra note 48.
5Supra note 53, at 277.
'Talbot v. Talbot, 120 Mont. 167, 181 P.2d 148 (1947); Application of Butts, 129
Mont. 440, 289 P.2d 949 (1955).
MState v. District Court, Gallatin County, 132 Mont. 357, 318 P.2d 571 (1957).
1Id. citing Enke, supra note 47.
'Carroll v. White, 25 St.Rep. 451, 443 P.2d 15 (Mont. 1968).
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By enacting the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (1968) and the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act (1963)"1 Montana
is moving forward. The effect of these Uniform Laws, however, has yet
to be determined.
SANDRA MUCKELSTON
'Repl. Vol. 7, R.C.M.1947, tit. 93, ch. 2601; R.C.M.1947, § 21-150.
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